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Abstract
Dependability is carving out a more and more important place in computer science. To in-
troduce this special issue on dependable computing, we present a synthetic overview of this
domain, intended for computer scientists. This paper attempts neither to enumerate nor to detail
the numerous particular research work leads on this theme. It rather introduces the requirements
from which research activities are stemmed. It synthesises the various issues handled by these ac-
tivities as well as the various solutions they propose. The content aims at providing to computer
scientists a pedagogical survey of the various problems, concepts and classes of studies relating
to dependable computing. Supplying a synthetic article does not allow, in particular, numerous
contributory persons and teams to be quoted or publications to be listed. The 0ve following
papers of this special issue tackle deeply speci0c aspects of this area. c© 2002 Elsevier Science
B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Dependable computing requirements
The increase in responsibilities delegated to computing systems constitutes a 0rst
characteristic of the advancement of these systems. Thirty years ago, their role was
mainly limited to restricted services explicitly controlled by users. These systems were
used:
• to increase the human activity productivity such as numerical computation allowing
simulation results to be quickly achieved, or publishing tools making printable text
obtaining easier, or
• to improve everyday life such as electronic ignition systems, reducing car pollution.
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Then, these systems became human assistants. ABS is such an example. It prevents the
car wheel blocking, taking the too violent reactions of the driver as well as the road
status into account at braking time. Nowadays, computing systems are substituting for
humans to take decisions. The car airbag opening is controlled by such a system.
The increase in computing system complexity is a second characteristic of the ad-
vancement of these systems. This increase is due to a greater number of provided
services (quantitative complexity), to the sophistication of the algorithms (qualitative
complexity) and to the increased interactions between the constituent subsystems. Once
again, computing systems embedded in cars provide good examples. Their number in-
creases: systems for fuel injection and ignition of the engine, management of braking,
steering and stability of cars, air conditioner regulation, etc. The implemented con-
trol laws are more and more complex. For instance, the engine control algorithms are
more sophisticated to decrease pollution (ignition advance, feedback of data charac-
terising the non-burned gas composition, etc.). These systems become more and more
highly coupled. For example, to control a car going too fast into a bend, the previously
mentioned subsystems have to be used simultaneously, requiring complex interactions.
The two quoted characteristics lead to a contradiction. On the one hand, the increas-
ing complexity of the systems makes inevitable the increase of faulty design risk and,
consequently, the increase of system failure risk in operation. On the other hand, more
and more responsibilities are delegated to these systems making the occurrence of such
failures more and more unacceptable.
This contradiction leads the computing system users to ask the following question:
what con0dence may I have in those systems to which I transfer a part of my re-
sponsibilities? This question asked by users is justi0ed by numerous tragic examples,
including patients killed by the failure of medical equipment, drivers injured in a car
accident due to untimely airbag opening, the loss of the 0rst launching of Ariane V.
This issue led to the following de0nition of the dependability concept.
Dependability is that property of a computer system such that reliance can justi-
9ably be placed on the service it delivers.
Dependability requirement has been extended to non-critical systems. For years, com-
puting system failures were accepted by users as inevitable. Nowadays, economical
constraints imposed on users of computing systems (service quality, hard deadlines,
etc.) make them less lenient.
2. Vocabulary
The above de0nition of dependability was proposed by Jean-Claude Laprie who
worked on the concepts of this emergent domain. Setting the problem to be solved,
structuring the requirements at the origin of this problem and the means to solve it are
essential aspects. They constitute the basis allowing dependability to be considered as
a science and not as an aggregate of experimental techniques used by engineers.
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This foundational work at 0rst took up studies on dependability impairments. Three
essential notions were de0ned:
• Failure characterises a wrong delivery of the computing system service. The system
has an actual behaviour, that is not in accordance with the expected behaviour, as
de0ned by the speci0cation.
• Fault is a failure cause. It is often expressed as a non-respect for a property on
the designed system structure. A connection of an integrated circuit being broken
or a program statement being bad are two examples. To point out the failure origin
is sometimes diFcult, for instance when detailed knowledge of the structure is not
available or when the causes come from outside or are multiple and combined.
• Error is an intermediate notion. It characterises the fault e*ect as an undesirable
internal functioning state of the system. A gate output stuck-at 1 or the access to an
array element that is out of range are two examples.
A cause and e*ect relationship exists between fault, error and failure. However, all
faults do not mandatory lead to an error, which in turn does not mandatory lead to
a failure. For example, a bad statement of a program (that is, a fault) may have no
e*ect (no error) if this statement is not used (dead code due to reuse). The assignment
of a value in an array, out of range, is an error. It does not provoke a failure if the
crushed value is no longer used by the program execution.
The modelling of dependability impairments constitutes a 0rst research area which
will be introduced in Section 3.
Whatever the protective means used to avoid failure occurrences, the reliance placed
on a computer system must be justi0ed. The measurement of this reliance (quantitative
approach) or an evaluation of the presence or appearance of faults and their e*ects
(fault forecasting or qualitative approach) provides this justi0cation. These viewpoints
are treated in Section 4.
This assessment activity, led a posteriori, that is, after the system realisation, is
completed by actions done during the computing system creation process. The research
activities conducted on this subject are distributed into three classes, respectively in-
troduced in Sections 5, 6 and 7.
• Fault prevention aiming at reducing the creation or occurrence of faults during the
system life cycle.
• Fault removal aiming at detecting and eliminating existing faults.
• Fault tolerance aiming at guaranteeing the correctness of services delivered by the
system despite the presence or appearance of faults.
Section 8 introduces the papers selected for this special issue.
3. Modelling of impairments
As in other sciences, dependability looks for models of the handled concepts: faults,
errors, failures and their consequences. Modelling tools then allow generic solutions
to be deduced, that is, solutions applicable to a class of problems or systems and not
limited to one speci0c problem or system. These modelling tools also allow to assess
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the eFciency of the means proposed to handle the impairments. For instance, the test
method relevance depends on its capability to detect the presence of faults. As actual
faults are generally unknown, fault models are often used.
The possible faults in a computing system are innumerable. They depend on the func-
tional characteristics of the system, on the used design modelling tool, on the imposed
design process and the actually used process, on the implementation technologies, on
the user of the system and on the non-functional environment (temperature, radiation,
etc.). The proposal of only one model of faults, errors or failures is not realistic. On
the other hand, the handling of each speci0c fault of each system requires empirical
and expensive studies. So, numerous modelling tools for faults, errors or failures were
proposed. Being generic modelling tools, that is, independent of particular systems,
they led to a scienti0c approach of dependability studies.
A 0rst set of modelling tools aims at characterising the e*ects of failures in the ap-
plication framework. The considered modelling criteria concern human and economical
or environmental damages. The seriousness of the consequences of the perturbations
caused by the failures is assessed. The modelling tool based on the following classes
is a conventional example: benign, signi0cant, serious and catastrophic. This model
is an abstraction of the term “failure”; fault models provide other abstractions on de-
pendability impairments, independent of this 0rst abstraction. For instance, a given
hardware fault in a micro-controller may have quite di*erent consequences depending
on whether this circuit is used in a game station or integrated in an embedded Kight
control system. Seriousness is one model among many that characterises failures. For
example, inertia, that is, duration between failure occurrence and its external e*ects
(consequences) is another criterion leading to other classes characterising the system
dependability.
The study of system faults and of means to handle them requires the choice of
fault modelling tools. A fault modelling tool is de0ned by properties on the system
structure model. For instance, the programming language syntax de0nition implicitly
expresses a fault modelling tool: each violation of a syntax rule by a program text is
a fault. Of course, the fault modelling tools depend on the modelling means used to
express the system structure. However, several fault models may be proposed for one
system modelling means. The violation of guidelines of a programming quality manual
is a second example of fault modelling tool associated with the previous programming
language. These examples show that, to de0ne a fault modelling tool, expected or
unexpected properties must be generic, that is, independent of speci0c systems. For
instance, a particular statement of a given program, which is not in accordance with
a rule of the programming language syntax, contains a fault speci0c to this program.
Nevertheless, the syntactic rules, which de0ne a fault modelling tool, are applicable to
any program.
Fault modelling has numerous applications such as eFciency measurement of fault
detection techniques used to extract them (fault removal) or to recover from acti-
vated faults (fault tolerance). Unfortunately, the exclusive use of these models is not
suFcient. In particular, numerous actual faults cannot be expressed with these models.
G. Motet, J.-C. Ge.roy / Theoretical Computer Science 290 (2003) 1115–1126 1119
They do not o*er a full coverage. For example, the analysis of the program extract “if
(A¡B) . . . ;” does not allow one to detect the presence of a fault using an absolute
system of reference (a fault model). The correct statement may be “if (A6B) . . . ;”,
“if (A¿B) . . . ;”, “while (A6B) . . . ;”, or “A :=B;”, etc. Consequently, the faults
are also studied from their e*ects on the internal system functioning. Bad states are
de0ned by error modelling tools. Once again, numerous error modelling tools have
been proposed. Some of them are general, that is, they do not depend on the system
modelling means. For instance, characterisation of errors as static or transient de0nes
two classes. Other models are derived from the semantics of the modelling means.
The use of the value of a variable not previously assigned is an example of an error
model associated with the behavioural model de0ned by the programming language
semantics. The run-time stack overKow de0nes another property violation, that is, an
error model, associated with the object code model. A deadlock, that is, a system state
progress blocking due to internal interactions of subsystems is another error model for
systems modelled by Petri nets or concurrent tasks.
The assessment of the relevance of the fault or error modelling tools is a diFcult
issue. The answer often depends on the use of the models. For instance, the program
test technique evaluation method based on mutations considers the replacement of an
arithmetic operation by another one as a fault modelling tool. Of course, no engineers
probably do such a fault. He=she makes more complex erroneous structure changing.
However, these mutations produce errors characteristic of behavioural e*ects of actual
design faults. Thus, these fault models are successfully used to assess functional test
sequences. Besides relevance, these models must be examined in term of tractabil-
ity, that is, their capabilities to be handled by processing tools. For instance, a fault
simulation with a too precise model may take prohibitive duration.
Generic fault or error modelling tools do not allow numerous faults or errors to
be expressed, as they are speci0c to the structure or the functioning of each system.
Therefore, speci0c faults or errors must be expressed. However, we want to preserve
the capability to do generic studies on them. Macro-models (or macro-languages) are
proposed to express them. ANNA (ANNotated Ada) is an example of such means.
Studies dealing with the de0nition, the use and the relevance of fault models are
still useful at present. In particular, these studies have to take the development of new
technologies and new application domains into account.
4. Dependability assessment
4.1. Dependability attributes and measurements
Dependability, that is, the justi0ed reliance placed on the services delivered by a
system, must be assessed to be justi0ed. Numerous attributes exist, taking various
meaning for the term “reliance on the services”. For most of them, a measurement is
de0ned as a conditional probability, which is function of time.
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For instance, reliability is the aptitude to accomplish a required function in given
conditions. Thus, reliability measurement is a function expressing the conditional proba-
bility that the system has survived without failure at time t, given that it was operational
at time 0. Availability, safety, integrity are other frequently used attributes.
Mathematical models describe probability laws of the correct operation of system
components. Parameters of these laws frequently depend on the used technology. Their
values are coming from experimental facts. Other parameters inKuence these laws, such
as the temperature for hardware technologies.
As system is a structure of components whose probabilistic models are known, com-
position operations provide laws for the complete system.
Non-probabilistic models also exist. For instance, some of them are based on the
measure of the structural or functional complexity of the system: the number of state-
ments in program blocks, the number of paths in the control Kow of a program or in a
behavioural model, etc. Since humans (the system designers) have limited intellectual
abilities, they cannot master highly complex systems. A fault presence risk is therefore
de0ned from the designed system complexity measurement.
4.2. Impairments analysis
Previous techniques concern quantitative approaches of dependability assessment.
Qualitative approaches examine relationships between faults, errors and failures. The
proposed qualitative approaches are distributed in the two following classes.
• Deductive approaches consist in deducing potential failures from the system faults
or errors for instance speci0ed by modelling tools. They use structural and=or be-
havioural models of the system to process this deduction, for example, by fault
simulations.
• Inductive approaches consider unwanted failures and infer errors, which may lead
to these failures, or show that such failures cannot occur (for instance, proof of
properties).
These two classes of techniques are complementary. On the one hand, inductive ap-
proaches seem to be more realistic, in particular, when fault or error modelling tools
used by deductive methods may leave out actual faults or errors. On the other hand,
inductive approaches are often not tractable as a huge number of system functionings
may lead to one given internal state. Such a problem occurs, for instance, when a pro-
gram uses “while” loop statements, as the actual number of iterations is often unknown.
Inferences are then constrained by hypotheses always debatable.
Two basic concepts are associated with the introduced approaches, namely:
• Controllability de0nes the capability to take the system to a given functioning state,
acting on the system inputs.
• Observability de0nes the capability to observe the internal state of the system from
the outputs.
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These notions apply to faults, errors and failures. For instance, they estimate the
capability to activate a fault, changing it into an error, and then to propagate this error
to the output, as a failure.
Controllability and observability are two characteristics, which are jointly expected
and unwanted. For instance, the testability of a system is all the more high since
controllability and observability are high. On the contrary, fault tolerance required dur-
ing system operation, needs to reduce fault activation, error contamination and failure
occurrence, that is, to reduce global controllability and observability.
To conclude this section, let us note that results of research activities on depend-
ability measurement and impairment analysis are useful at 0rst when system design
is completed. They provide means to assess the reliance which can be placed on this
system. These means are also eFcient during the design steps as they provide predic-
tive tools. Design choices are validated or rejected taking the obtained measures into
account.
5. Fault prevention
Fault prevention aims at reducing the creation or occurrence of faults during the
computing system life cycle. Means are used during the system design phase. Some of
them have an impact on the created system. Others prevent faults occurring during its
useful life. These means concern the system modelling tools (including implementation
technologies), the system models and the processes used to obtain these models.
The modelling means have an important e*ect on dependability of the modelled
systems. This fact is well known for implementation models. Certain technologies are
safer than others. For instance, they prevent faults introduced during the hardware sys-
tem manufacturing step or occurring during operational phase in hostile environment
(space for example). Some investigations concern the software implementation mod-
elling tools. Studies on requirement, speci0cation and design modelling means, using
their capability to prevent faults as analysis criterion, is relatively little-developed.
A modelling means being chosen, numerous modelling choices and therefore nu-
merous models, exist for one particular system. Generally, the choice is guided by
performance or maintainability criteria but rarely looking for fault prevention. At 0rst,
the obtained models aim at being operational, that is executable. Due to this single
goal, the pieces of information coming from the system origin (Why is this system
useful? What system must be designed?) are lost: they are not present in the created
model. They are substituted for data associated with the realisation, answering to the
question: How is the system designed? The preservation of the 0rst type of pieces of
information in the models, certainly not useful for operation, is an eFcient means to
prevent faults. This example illustrates the general concept of redundancy, also used
for fault removal and fault tolerance purposes. Whereas the term “redundancy” is con-
ventionally regarded as the meaning “supplementary” and “not useful”, in fact, it is an
eFcient concept to obtain dependable computing systems.
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Mastering the model creation process is a third means of fault prevention. Studies on
this point include researches on quality policies, processes and procedures. They aim
at modelling the development process, at assessing its eFciency to prevent faults and
at improving the process. This approach is original as it concerns neither the developed
system, nor the means used (modelling tools, etc.). It studies the human process used to
create a system. The underlying idea is that numerous design faults existing in systems
are coming from faults occurring in the design process.
Relationships exist between studies concerning models (and modelling means) and
modelling process. For instance, the intellectual capabilities of humans being limited,
the designers cannot simultaneously handle numerous concepts (process issue). So, the
modelling tool must allow abstraction hierarchies to be expressed, o*ering suitable
features such as modules (modelling tool features).
Works on fault prevention belong to the proposal of guidelines (or rules) helping
(or compelling) the designer to choose modelling tools and to use them (modelling
process and model characteristics). These proposals are equivalent to rules existing in
all professions.
6. Fault removal
Fault removal aims at detecting and eliminating existing faults. Studies on fault
removal are older that those on fault prevention. They were initially justi0ed by man-
ufacturing checks of hardware systems. Then, they were extended to model checking.
The proposed techniques are therefore numerous and varied. We do not want to expose
them one by one. We synthesise their presentation, introducing criteria allowing them
to be classi0ed.
Firstly, fault presence may be detected by static analysis (for instance, inspection
or property checking) or dynamic analysis (for instance, testing). The 0rst class of
techniques does not need system execution which is required by the second group.
Secondly, the examined model concerns the system realisation (structural approach),
the function provided by the system ( functional approach) or both (structural–funct-
ional approach). In the 0rst case, the presence of faults is highlighted; in the second
case, the studies handle failures; in the third case, error notion is the main concept as
well as relationships between faults, errors and failures.
Thirdly, fault detection turns on a certainty (for example, a speci0c fault, error or
failure) or a risk. In this second situation, the techniques search for the potentiality of
the presence of fault, error or failure (presence probability). Measurements on systems
are de0ned and associated with risk levels (cf. dependability assessment). For instance,
the more complex the control Kow of a program is, the more diFcult is the mastering
of the program by its designer and so, the greater is the risk of a design fault being
present. The measurements assess the model (complexity measurements) or the use of
the modelling tool features. For instance, the use of the “goto” statement or of shared
variables increases the fault risk. On the contrary, the use of an “else null” option if
no action is necessary when a test is negative decreases the risk of an omission fault.
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Detection generally requires a reference model being compared with the created
model. This reference model concerns system requirements or speci0cations, but also
system design or implementation. This model expresses what is expected (approach
based on good functioning) or unwanted (approach based on bad functioning). The
reference model is given by extension (everything which is expected or not) or by
intention (properties). This reference model may be the one used by the current step
(for instance, the speci0cation model at design step) or another. Certain techniques do
not need additional reference model. Faults, errors or failures are detected by examin-
ing the current system model. Taking the programming model as example, data Kow
analysis techniques show variables assigned two times without being used.
Most of the techniques handle one of the three notions (fault, error or failure). Some
aim at handling links between them. Fault diagnosis methods provide such an example.
From the origin, fault removal techniques are used to detect the presence of faults.
They are also useful to prove the absence of faults. Then, they provide means to assess
dependability of computing systems.
Finally, assessment of fault removal techniques is another large investigation area.
What are the interests and limits of these techniques? What are their speci0c contri-
bution and so their complementarity? The answers to these questions are essential to
de0ne fault removal policies. These studies have an immediate practical interest as
economical constraints do not allow all the means o*ered by research activity results
to be used jointly.
Fault removal techniques are often considered at the end of the model de0nition,
particularly when an operational model of the system is complete. However, these
means may have a great inKuence on the system model or on the modelling process.
This subject is also a research area (for instance, design for testability).
Fault prevention and fault removal domains are put together under the term Fault
avoidance. Research activities associating these two domains are useful. For example,
the de0nition of a development process aiming at preventing faults, often uses fault
removal techniques at each process step.
7. Fault tolerance
Fault tolerance aims at guaranteeing the services delivered by the system despite the
presence or appearance of faults.
Fault tolerance approaches are divided into two classes:
• compensation techniques for which the structural redundancy of the system masks
the fault presence, and,
• error detection and recovery techniques, that is, detection and then resumption of
the execution either from a safe state or after the operational structure modi0cation
(recon9guration).
Error recovery techniques are split into two sub-classes:
• backward recovery aiming at resuming execution in a previously reached safe state;
• forward recovery aiming at resuming execution in a new safe state.
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In numerous industrial systems, intensive use of fault tolerance techniques is too ex-
pensive both in terms of development and resources. In particular, this last expenditure
is added to each produced system. To reduce these over-costs, some benign failures
are accepted. For instance, when a car quickly overtakes another car, the processor
is full-time used to control the engine; then, tasks managing the air-conditioner are
temporary suspended. Fail-safe techniques jointly study failure seriousness and fault
tolerance.
Assessment of the eFciency of fault tolerance techniques is another important in-
vestigation area. It uses fault and error models and again poses the problem of the
pertinence of such models.
Fault tolerance research activities concern the system viewpoint as well as software
and hardware implementation technologies. The projection of the results of studies done
on system modelling onto technological levels is not so easy. This issue comes from
the fact that hypotheses implicitly used at system level are not correct when technology
characteristics are considered. For instance, the switch from a failed component to a
clone is eFcient to tolerate faults of hardware technologies. This technique is ineFcient
to tolerate design faults or most of the software technology faults. Moreover, most of
the research activities on fault tolerance concern one technology whereas complex
interactions exist in real systems between hardware and software elements.
The various approaches used to obtain a dependable computing system (dependability
assessment, fault prevention, removal and tolerance) were introduced separately. They
provide complementary contributions. However, these aspects are also correlated. For
example, fault tolerance mechanisms aim at increasing the system reliability. However,
as these means are often complex, they increase the fault risk and thus they can
go against fault prevention requirements. Moreover, they make fault detection more
diFcult, by reducing the system observability. Thus, fault tolerance techniques may
lead to a system reliability decrease. As a consequence, transverse researches, globally
studying computing system dependability, are also essential.
8. Introduction of the papers
Dependable Computing is a large scienti0c domain, concerning numerous and various
research activities. Studies examine implementation technologies, system modelling,
and system development. The 0ve papers of this special issue tackle several important
aspects.
Integration of numerous software components is an increasing need. As mentioned
in the 0rst section, it is also the cause of numerous faults. The paper of Colby et al.
proposes the de0nition of safety properties associated with integration issues at ob-
ject code level as well as means to check them. The authors show how properties may
be automatically generated at compile-time from invariants associated with the language
semantics.
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Whereas the previous paper handles fault removal by behavioural studies of software
systems, the one by Caruso et al. concerns the structural viewpoint. The authors propose
a diagnosis algorithm that identi0es erroneous components. The system structure is a
grid whose components check their neighbours. However, a component test may detect
a failed check whereas the checked component is correct, as the checker is faulty. The
presented results provide a solution to this problem. The proposed diagnosis algorithm
is useful to remove faults but also to initiate a recovery or a recon0guration in a fault
tolerant system.
The actual eFciency of fault tolerance techniques depends on the fault or error
models used to assess them. The paper of Walter and Suri proposes a classi0cation of
system component faults, taking their e*ects on the global behaviour of the system into
account. The study considers distributed systems using synchronous communications.
The status of a component (faulty or not) is discerned by other components through
the contents of messages originating from the considered component, or the absence
of an expected message. From this classi0cation, the authors deduce a voter function
and convergence and consensus functions to compute values replacing the erroneous
ones in order to implement a forward recovery.
The paper of Cao and Singhal handles distributed systems proposing a backward
recovery technique based on checkpointing of each component. The de0nition of a
consistent global state to resume the execution is necessary as the components (pro-
cesses) are interdependent (synchronisations, etc.). The previously proposed solutions
induced a great overhead. The paper exposes a checkpointing algorithm which neither
blocks the underlying computation nor forces all the processes to take checkpoints. It
demonstrates that the proposed algorithm creates a consistent global checkpoint.
As mentioned, the complexity of fault tolerance mechanisms is the cause of numerous
errors and sometimes failing systems. Prasetya and Swierstra formalise the behaviours
of components which cause faults, which detect errors and which handle them, as
well as the interactions between these components. Then, the authors obtain the actual
behaviour of the fault tolerant system, to demonstrate its eFciency. The used formalism
is based on UNITY theory.
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